Until Thursday afternoon, there had been areassuring sense of restrained, tit-for-tatreciprocity in the trade skirmish between theUnited States and China.
截至周四下午，美國(guó)與中國(guó)的貿(mào)易沖突仍有一種令人放心的、有節(jié)制的以牙還牙的感覺(jué)。
But if this spirals into a bigger conflict between theworld’s two biggest economies — something thatseemed to become more likely Thursday evening withPresident Trump’s threat to add $100 billion more intariffs — it’s worth keeping something in mind: In atrade war, the usual rules of commerce may not apply.
但如果情況失去控制，導(dǎo)致世界上兩個(gè)最大經(jīng)濟(jì)體之間發(fā)生一場(chǎng)更大沖突的話，有件事情值得銘記于心：在一場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中，通常的商業(yè)規(guī)則可能不再適用。隨著周四晚上特朗普總統(tǒng)威脅要把征收關(guān)稅的中國(guó)商品價(jià)值再擴(kuò)大1000億美元，沖突升級(jí)的可能性看來(lái)變得更大。
That is doubly true in a potential trade war with China, for several reasons.
在與中國(guó)潛在的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中更是如此，原因有幾個(gè)。
Because the country exports far more in goods to the United States than it imports, Chinasimply doesn’t have as much room to keep up with escalating American tariffs, especially giventhe Chinese government’s desire to cushion its citizens from higher prices for food staples.
由于中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)出口的商品遠(yuǎn)多于進(jìn)口的商品，中國(guó)沒(méi)有足夠多的進(jìn)口商品可征稅，以達(dá)到不斷升級(jí)的美國(guó)征收的關(guān)稅的水平，尤其是考慮到中國(guó)政府不想讓國(guó)內(nèi)的人受到食品價(jià)格上漲的影響。
Moreover, China has in the past proved willing to use a wide range of government powers toachieve commercial objectives — from campaigns against out-of-favor companies in statemedia to selective, stepped-up regulatory enforcement. And if things really get nasty, theUnited States and China are financially intertwined in ways that China could seek to exploit — though not without creating risks for a country holding $1.2 trillion in United States Treasurybonds.
此外，過(guò)去已有事實(shí)證明，中國(guó)愿意使用廣泛的政府權(quán)力來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)商業(yè)目標(biāo)——從使用官方媒體抨擊失寵企業(yè)，到選擇性地加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管執(zhí)法。如果情況真的變?cè)悖袊?guó)可能會(huì)尋找美國(guó)與中國(guó)在經(jīng)濟(jì)上密切相關(guān)的方式加以利用，盡管對(duì)于一個(gè)持有1.2萬(wàn)億美元美國(guó)國(guó)債的中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，這樣做并非沒(méi)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
“One of the very important tools that the Chinese have is the ability to make life difficult for alarge number of American businesses,” said Eswar Prasad, an economist at Cornell Universitywho studies Chinese economic relations. “They have all of these unconventional weapons thatare not covered by traditional trading rules that could be potent weapons in actually fighting atrade war.”
“中國(guó)擁有的非常重要的工具之一，是讓大量的美國(guó)企業(yè)在中國(guó)的日子不好過(guò)，”康奈爾大學(xué)(CornellUniversity)研究中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家埃斯瓦爾·普拉薩德(Eswar Prasad)說(shuō)�！八麄冇兴羞@些不受傳統(tǒng)交易規(guī)則管轄的非常規(guī)性武器，這些武器在真打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)時(shí)可能會(huì)很有效�！�
The details of what China might do are speculative. Thus far, China’s government has reactedto new tariff actions by the Trump administration with relatively restrained words andpromises of proportional responses to the American government’s actions.
對(duì)于中國(guó)可能采取的措施的細(xì)節(jié)，目前只能進(jìn)行推測(cè)。迄今為止，中國(guó)政府對(duì)特朗普政府征收新關(guān)稅的宣布所做出的回應(yīng)相對(duì)克制，只承諾要對(duì)美國(guó)政府的行動(dòng)做出相應(yīng)的回應(yīng)。
The Americans put tariffs on steel and aluminum; China responds by taxing American pork. The Trump administration’s plans to tax $50 billion worth of Chinese imports is met withthreats by the Chinese to subject $50 billion worth of American products to the same.
美國(guó)宣布對(duì)鋼鐵和鋁征收關(guān)稅；中國(guó)宣布對(duì)美國(guó)豬肉征收關(guān)稅作為回應(yīng)。特朗普政府要對(duì)價(jià)值500億美元的中國(guó)進(jìn)口商品征收關(guān)稅的計(jì)劃，得到了中國(guó)政府要對(duì)500億美元的等值美國(guó)產(chǎn)品征收同樣關(guān)稅的威脅。
Those tariffs won’t even go into effect until after a comment period, setting up a potentiallylong period of lobbying and negotiation that could rein in their scope or even delay themindefinitely.
這些關(guān)稅要在一個(gè)評(píng)論期過(guò)后才會(huì)生效，可能會(huì)引發(fā)一個(gè)長(zhǎng)時(shí)間的游說(shuō)和談判的努力，讓關(guān)稅征收的范圍縮小，甚至讓一些關(guān)稅被無(wú)限期推遲。
But just because matters have been calibrated thus far doesn’t mean they will stay that way. American financial markets have been swinging wildly in recent weeks as investors revise theirpredictions for what might come next.
但僅僅因?yàn)槠駷橹沟淖龇ū容^克制，并不意味著會(huì)永遠(yuǎn)這樣下去。最近幾周，隨著投資者修正他們對(duì)未來(lái)可能發(fā)生情況的預(yù)測(cè)，美國(guó)金融市場(chǎng)一直在劇烈波動(dòng)。
The Tough Math of Tit-for-Tat
以牙還牙的困難計(jì)算
As President Trump often notes, the United States does run a large trade deficit with China — especially if you look only at goods, and don’t count the value of services. That means that ifChina seeks to match tariffs on goods — a classic tit-for-tat approach — China runs out of “tats” pretty quickly.
正如特朗普總統(tǒng)經(jīng)常指出的那樣，美國(guó)確實(shí)對(duì)中國(guó)存在巨大的貿(mào)易逆差——尤其是如果只看商品，而不考慮服務(wù)的價(jià)值的話。這就意味著，如果中國(guó)試圖對(duì)同等價(jià)值的商品征收關(guān)稅的話——這是典型的以牙還牙的做法——中國(guó)的“牙”很快會(huì)不夠用。
In 2017, the United States imported $506 billion in goods from China while exporting only $131 billion in goods to China, according to data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)分析局(Bureau of Economic Analysis)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2017年，美國(guó)從中國(guó)進(jìn)口了價(jià)值5060億美元的商品，但只向中國(guó)出口了價(jià)值1310億美元的商品。
“It mathematically means that China can’t match the U.S. dollar for dollar,” said Brad Setser, asenior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
“這意味著在商品價(jià)值上，中國(guó)無(wú)法與美國(guó)針?shù)h相對(duì)，”美國(guó)外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)(Council on Foreign Relations)高級(jí)研究員布拉德·塞策(Brad Setser)說(shuō)。
So, for example, if the Trump administration follows through on the president’s suggestion toconsider expanding the tariffs to cover $100 billion more of goods, it would strain the Chinesegovernment to respond in a dollar-for-dollar manner.
因此，比方說(shuō)如果特朗普政府按照總統(tǒng)的建議去做，考慮把征收關(guān)稅商品的范圍再擴(kuò)大1000億美元的話，將會(huì)讓中國(guó)政府作出同等價(jià)值的回應(yīng)變得很勉強(qiáng)。
And that’s before you account for the Chinese government’s reluctance to put tariffs ongoods that might carry some political or strategic cost.
而且這是在考慮到中國(guó)政府不愿對(duì)可能帶來(lái)政治或戰(zhàn)略代價(jià)的商品征收關(guān)稅之前。
For example, in its planned retaliatory tariffs, the Chinese government included narrow-bodyaircraft but not wide-body aircraft. This makes sense strategically, Mr. Setser argued, becauseonly two companies in the world make wide-body planes: Boeing and Airbus. If China put atariff on planes from the American Boeing but not the European Airbus, it would lose leveragewith Airbus with which to extract favorable prices and access to cutting-edge technology.
舉例來(lái)說(shuō)，在征收?qǐng)?bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅的計(jì)劃中，中國(guó)政府把窄體飛機(jī)包括了進(jìn)去，但沒(méi)有包括寬體飛機(jī)。塞策認(rèn)為，這在戰(zhàn)略上有道理，因?yàn)槭澜缟现挥袃杉夜旧a(chǎn)寬體飛機(jī)：波音(Boeing)和空客(Airbus)。如果中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)波音公司的飛機(jī)征收關(guān)稅，但不對(duì)歐洲空客的飛機(jī)征收關(guān)稅的話，中國(guó)將失去為得到優(yōu)惠價(jià)格、獲得尖端技術(shù)與空客談判的籌碼。
China has already imposed tariffs on the easy stuff: luxury goods like American wine and liquor, and agricultural goods that are considered luxuries within China, like almonds and pistachios. Itis unlikely there will be uprisings in the streets of Shanghai if Kentucky bourbon gets moreexpensive.
中國(guó)已經(jīng)對(duì)容易的商品征收關(guān)稅：像美國(guó)葡萄酒和烈性酒這樣的奢侈品，以及中國(guó)視為奢侈品的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品，譬如杏仁和開(kāi)心果。如果只是肯塔基波旁威士忌變得更貴的話，上海的大街上不太可能出現(xiàn)暴動(dòng)。
But in the latest round, China has said it will raise tariffs on American soybeans. That is likely tocause President Trump political problems in farm states, but it also risks raising food costswithin China. It’s a fair bet, then, that China views remaining options as even more problematicfor the prices of staple goods or the country’s industrial strategy.
但是在最近一輪中，中國(guó)表示將提高對(duì)美國(guó)大豆的關(guān)稅。這可能會(huì)讓美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普在農(nóng)業(yè)州遇到政治問(wèn)題，但這也可能提高中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的食品價(jià)格。因此可以合理地預(yù)測(cè)，中國(guó)認(rèn)為剩下的選擇會(huì)給主要商品的價(jià)格或國(guó)家產(chǎn)業(yè)戰(zhàn)略帶來(lái)更多的問(wèn)題。
In other words, for China the low-hanging fruit is gone. If this trade battle continues toescalate, China will have to bear a greater cost.
換句話說(shuō)，對(duì)于中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，容易摘的果子已經(jīng)沒(méi)了。如果這場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)繼續(xù)升級(jí)，中國(guó)將不得不承擔(dān)更大的代價(jià)。
Commercial Guerrilla Warfare
商業(yè)游擊戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)
That reality could push China to seek other buttons to press. And while there is no recentprecedent of a trade war to draw from, the Chinese government’s actions in other types ofdisputes offer a potential road map.
這個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)可能迫使中國(guó)尋找其他的應(yīng)對(duì)方式。雖然沒(méi)有最近的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)可以作為先例，但中國(guó)政府在其它類型的爭(zhēng)端中的做法為此提供了一個(gè)可能的路線圖。
For one thing, American companies do significant business in China that doesn’t show up intrade data. When Apple assembles an iPhone in Zhengzhou and sells it in Shanghai, thatdoesn’t count as international trade, though the profits accrue to the benefit of a California-based company. The Chinese government has any number of tools to try to weaken thatbusiness if it wishes. It could decide that phones made by a foreign company are a nationalsecurity threat, or shut down plants because of minor regulatory problems.
首先，美國(guó)公司在中國(guó)有相當(dāng)部分的業(yè)務(wù)并沒(méi)有在貿(mào)易數(shù)據(jù)中表現(xiàn)出來(lái)。蘋(píng)果公司(Apple)的iPhone在鄭州組裝、在上海賣出，這并不算國(guó)際貿(mào)易，雖然利潤(rùn)被一家總部位于加州的公司所獲得。如果中國(guó)政府愿意的話，它有很多可以試圖用來(lái)削弱這種生意的工具。政府可以決定，外國(guó)公司生產(chǎn)的手機(jī)是對(duì)國(guó)家安全的威脅，或者可以因?yàn)樾〉谋O(jiān)管問(wèn)題而關(guān)閉工廠。
“That’s the kind of thing they could reduce dramatically if they wanted to,” said Nicholas Lardy, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “To their credit, they havenot hinted that this is on their agenda, and they seem to be sticking to this idea, that theirresponse will be reciprocal and not escalatory. But they have plenty of other options.”
“如果他們想做的話，他們可以大大減少這類業(yè)務(wù)，”彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所(Peterson Institute forInternational Economics)高級(jí)研究員尼古拉斯·拉迪(Nicholas Lardy)說(shuō)�！爸档觅潛P(yáng)的是，他們沒(méi)有暗示這在他們的計(jì)劃之中，而且他們似乎堅(jiān)持的觀點(diǎn)是，他們的回應(yīng)是一報(bào)還一報(bào)，而不是升級(jí)。不過(guò)，他們還有很多其他的選擇�！�
Making life difficult for American companies in China as retaliation in a trade war need not beformal and widely publicized. American automakers who make cars in China might find theirlocal joint-venture partners squeezing them out. Regional governments might send safetyinspectors to plants of American companies so often as to disrupt production.
讓美國(guó)公司在中國(guó)的日子不好過(guò)，把這作為貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中的報(bào)復(fù)做法不需要正式宣布，也不需要廣泛宣傳。在中國(guó)制造汽車的美國(guó)汽車制造商可能會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，他們?cè)诋?dāng)?shù)氐暮腺Y伙伴要將他們擠出市場(chǎng)。地方政府可能會(huì)頻繁派遣安全檢查員到美國(guó)公司的工廠去檢查，以致于生產(chǎn)被打亂。
There are more public options, too. For example, in 2013, Chinese state media accused JaguarLand Rover and Audi of overcharging buyers for car parts, which analysts viewed as part of acampaign to pressure those automakers to locate more manufacturing in China.
還有更多的公開(kāi)選擇。比如，2013年，中國(guó)官方媒體指責(zé)捷豹路虎(Jaguar Land Rover)和奧迪(Audi)對(duì)汽車零部件的買(mǎi)家要價(jià)過(guò)高。分析師認(rèn)為，那是在向這些汽車制造商施壓，讓它們把更多的制造工作搬到中國(guó)去。
Bruising in the Bond Market?
在債券市場(chǎng)上遇挫？
For years, American politicians have fretted about China’s role as the United States’ largestcreditor; the nation has accumulated a huge stockpile of Treasury bonds over the last 20 years.
多年以來(lái)，美國(guó)政客一直擔(dān)心中國(guó)作為美國(guó)最大債權(quán)國(guó)的角色；在過(guò)去的20年里，中國(guó)積累了大量的美國(guó)國(guó)債。
Could China use its role as No. 1 lender to exert pressure in a trade war?
中國(guó)是否會(huì)利用其第一債權(quán)人的角色，在一場(chǎng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中對(duì)美國(guó)施加壓力呢？
It would be a risky maneuver, in which China itself would potentially have much to lose. But itcan’t be ruled out.
這將是一個(gè)冒險(xiǎn)的策略，這樣做可能會(huì)給中國(guó)本身帶來(lái)很大的損失。但不能排除這種可能性。
If China were to suddenly unload some of its holdings, or even signal an intention to buyfewer dollar assets in the future, that would probably cause long-term interest rates in theUnited States to rise, at least temporarily. And this would cause some pain in the UnitedStates, as borrowing costs — whether for the federal government or individual home buyers — would rise.
如果中國(guó)突然拋售所持的部分債券，或者只是暗示有意在未來(lái)購(gòu)買(mǎi)更少的美元資產(chǎn)，可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致美國(guó)的長(zhǎng)期利率上升，至少是暫時(shí)的上升。這將給美國(guó)帶來(lái)一些痛苦，因?yàn)檫@會(huì)導(dǎo)致借貸成本上升，無(wú)論對(duì)聯(lián)邦政府還是個(gè)人購(gòu)房者來(lái)說(shuō)。
But it would also drive down the value of China’s existing bond portfolio, meaning China couldlose billions. And it would tend to push down the value of the dollar relative to other currencies, which would actually help the United States attain more advantageous trade terms.
但這也會(huì)讓中國(guó)目前持有的債券投資組合的價(jià)值降低，這意味著中國(guó)可能要損失數(shù)十億美元。而且，這會(huì)降低美元相對(duì)于其他貨幣的比價(jià)，實(shí)際上幫助美國(guó)獲得更有利的貿(mào)易條件。
Even after all that, bond prices would most likely readjust over time as other buyers tookadvantage of the rise in interest rates. In the medium term, the performance of the UnitedStates economy and actions of the Federal Reserve do more to determine bond prices thanthe decisions of a single buyer or seller, even one as large as China.
即使在這之后，債券價(jià)格很可能會(huì)隨著時(shí)間的推移而重新調(diào)整，因?yàn)槠渌I(mǎi)家會(huì)利用利率上升的有利條件。從中期來(lái)看，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的表現(xiàn)和美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的行動(dòng)對(duì)決定債券價(jià)格所起的作用，比單個(gè)債權(quán)人的決定大得多，即使這個(gè)債權(quán)人有中國(guó)這么大。
That doesn’t mean there isn’t room to cause some near-term pain and disruption. “The Chinesehave some leverage to rattle U.S. bond markets, even if the threat of substantive action isnot very credible,” Mr. Prasad said.
這并不意味著短期內(nèi)沒(méi)有制造一些痛苦和混亂的余地�！凹词共扇�(shí)質(zhì)性行動(dòng)的威脅不太可信，中國(guó)也有一些能擾亂美國(guó)債券市場(chǎng)的籌碼，”普拉薩德說(shuō)。
Given that a trade war with such a major trading partner is without precedent in moderntimes, we don’t really know what it would look like. But it’s a safe bet that Chinese officials arealready thinking through their options in case that is where the latest round of economic saberrattling ultimately leads.
考慮到與一個(gè)如此重要的貿(mào)易伙伴的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)在現(xiàn)代歷史上沒(méi)有先例，我們真的不知道它會(huì)是什么樣。但可以肯定的是，中國(guó)官員已經(jīng)在認(rèn)真考慮他們的選項(xiàng)，以防最新這一輪經(jīng)濟(jì)上的相互威脅最終走到貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的地步。
